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The article explores the Cuban government’s reaction to COVID-19,
emphasising its control of the press and the role of the Revolutionary
Armed Forces (FAR). The main question is whether the health crisis
could empower or weaken the government vis-à-vis civil society.
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The pandemic found most Latin American countries with weak democratic institutions,
economic recessions, political leaders under scrutiny, and mobilised civil societies. In this
troubled context, an important factor conditioning the impact of COVID-19 has been
the governments’ control of information.
In his book Development as Freedom, Sen (1999) analysed one of the most impor-
tant differences between a dictatorship and a democracy, comparing China and India
managing famines. Sen studied the Chinese government’s policies to face the famine
of 1958–1961 that killed 30 million people and he emphasised that, since India’s inde-
pendence and the establishment of a multi-party democracy, its government had avoided
famines. The differences and the incentives that Sen finds between these two government
systems are vast.
In countries where information is controlled it is impossible to know the real levels
of infection, the actors who are managing the crisis, or the efficiency of the measures
implemented. In addition, in many countries, authorities have turned to the armed forces
to alleviate the effects of the imposed restrictions. In the current crisis, it is worth looking
at the consequences that COVID-19 can have in a political context where both factors
are at play: rigid control of information and the political role of the armed forces. In
Latin America, Cuba is the country that offers such a context.
This article explores the management of information by the Cuban government and
the role that the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR, Revolutionary Armed Forces)
have assumed. Can the control of information and the role of the FAR strengthen the
Cuban government during this crisis? Or, on the contrary, will the failures of the health
system, shortages, and the fall in remittances and in tourism exhaust the patience of the
Cuban people and lead to civil protest?
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We conducted a survey of Cuban residents of the island. Although the number
(27 Cubans) is not fully representative of the whole society, their contribution is
added to by sources from both the independent and official press and from academic
analysis.
Government Measures
On 24 March, the First Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party, Army General Raúl
Castro Ruz, and the President of the Republic, Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez, activated
the Defence Committees of provinces and municipalities, with the objective of carrying
out the prevention and control measures of COVID-19. The Defence Committees are
led by citizens, although as seen in the municipalities’ press, for example in Las Tunas
(Barrientos Matos, 2020) or Villa Clara (Fernández Ramirez, 2020), in their communi-
cation with the population they appear dressed in military uniform. In the past few years,
their interventions have been directed towards alleviating the consequences of climate
severity like Hurricane Irma in 2017.
Among the survey responses we received, for those who support the government,
convening the Defence Committees and preparing a greater FAR presence in the streets
are the correct decisions. They argue that the Defence Committees are already prepared
for crisis management and, along with the FAR’s presence, they prevent an increase in
corruption.
The FAR organises queues for the purchase of food provisions, disinfects the streets,
and ensures quarantine compliance. From the opposition’s perspective, their role should
be to try to resolve the economic crisis now as, since the 1990s special period, they have
taken control of the means of production and commercialisation.
Government supporters emphasise two strengths. First, they trust that the author-
ities are making decisions based on the opinion of Cuban medical experts who are
world renowned. Secondly, they affirm that the government has acted with exceptional
informative transparency. This contradicts the research published by the Institute of
Latin American Studies of Columbia University (ILAS, 2020), whose charts show an
absence of information regarding economic measures to counteract the pandemic’s
impact.
The government’s communication strategy is summarised in an article published by
Granma on 24 March entitled ‘La fabula de la silla voladora’ (The fable of the flying
chair) that asked for the silencing of voices opposing the measures used to fight the
pandemic (Estevez Rams, 2020). The line is that the government has the ability to resolve
the crisis and provides trustworthy data. Cubans can keep quiet and wait.
A reading of the most followed Twitter accounts in Cuba – young students, cuen-
tapropistas or journalists – shows that the most relevant topics are internet prices,
connection issues, the Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba Sociedad Anónima
(ETECSA, Telecommunications Company of Cuba) monopoly, the long queues to buy
chicken, the lack of freedom and the persecution of artists and journalists. There are
very few references to the pandemic.
Each country has faced this health crisis according to the resources they have and
Cuba has scarce economic resources and stagnant leadership. The country has a weak
civil society, there is no legal framework to protect it, there is mistrust among different
groups and fear of repression. Its population is more worried about a daily fight for
survival than the problems of the virus.
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The Revolutionary Armed Forces, Back on the Scene?
The daily Granma, on 6 April, reported that members of the Prevention Troops Brigade
(Brigadas Tropas de Prevención) of the Revolutionary Armed Forces and Havana’s
Regiment of Special Regional Military Troops (Regimiento de Tropas Especiales de la
Región Militar de La Habana) deployed an intense awareness-raising effort regarding
the dangers of COVID-19 (Ramos, 2020). In the same article, a photographic report
about the role of the Special Troops and the preventive action of the FAR in avoiding
the propagation of the virus was published (Ramos, 2020). Cuba is different from the
majority of Latin American countries because the Revolutionary Armed Forces do not
get involved in human rights violations and they maintain a high level of popularity.
However, there is a critical eye on the FAR’s high command for controlling the economy,
especially for their almost exclusive management of the tourism sector (Tedesco and
Diamint,2020). The social classes that the Revolution attempted to erase from the
map are well established in one of its most emblematic institutions: the high command
of the FAR have become capitalist businessmen and the middle and lower command
(particularly the soldiers on military service) represent the Cuban people.
The medical missions that the government has sent abroad sometimes are confused
with the FAR. France 24 maintained that Fidel Castro had given an assurance that no
medical professional would be a political pawn: ‘Our doctors will not mix with internal
politics in the slightest. They will be extremely respectful of the law, traditions, and
customs of the countries where they work. They do not have a mission to propagate
ideologies’, said the then Head of State in 1998 (Calle Aguirre, 2020). It is difficult to
confirm if the medical brigades are simultaneously members of the FAR, but it is true
that health services are the second highest source of revenue in the Gross Domestic
Product, and with the obvious fall of tourism it is likely to become the first source of
revenue. According to the available information, in the last decade professionals working
abroad have contributed annually 11,000 million dollars to the Cuban state, of which
9000 million came from doctors and medical personnel (Deutsche Welle (DW), 2020).
Conclusions
Most Cubans fear a return to the 1990s and the ‘special period’ when the Soviet Union
collapsed and Cuba’s economy followed suit. State Security persecution directed against
independent journalists or artists continues during the pandemic.
As Sen argued, dictatorships make sure they control information and maintain the
balance of power. In Cuba this balance means that the hierarchy of the Revolutionary
Armed Forces continue to defend their privileges, while Cubans, the ones the Revolution
came to liberate, are condemned to survive in the midst of scarcity and endless waiting
hours in empty markets. So far, there are no signs to suggest that the health crisis could
change that. On the contrary, the July economic measures (Monreal, 2020), mainly the
opening of food shops that only accept convertible money (US dollars), are another sign
of deepening economic and social gaps.
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